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Explicating concepts in reasoning from function to form by two-step innovative 
abductions 
 
Abstract 
The mechanism of design reasoning from function to form is suggested to consist of a two-
step inference of the innovative abduction type. First is an inference from a desired functional 
aspect to an idea, concept or solution principle to satisfy the function. This is followed by a 
second innovative abduction, from the latest concept to form, structure or mechanism. The 
intermediate entity in the logical reasoning, the concept, is thus made explicit, which is 
significant in following and understanding a specific design process, for educating designers, 
and to build a logic-based computational model of design. The idea of a two-step abductive 
reasoning process is developed from the critical examination of several propositions made by 
others. We accept the notion of innovative abduction in design, as opposed to science’s 
explanatory abduction, and we adopt a previously proposed two-step process of abductive 
reasoning. However, our model is different in that the two abductions used follow the 
syllogistic pattern of innovative abduction. In addition to using a schematic example from the 
literature to demonstrate our derivation, we apply the model to an existing, empirically 
derived method of conceptual design called “parameter analysis”, and use two examples of 
real design processes. The two synthetic steps of the method are shown to follow the proposed 
double innovative abduction scheme, and the design processes are presented as sequences of 
double abductions from function to concept and from concept to form, with a subsequent 
deductive evaluation step. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that design begins with a function, a need to be satisfied, and terminates 
with form, a description of a proposed artifact–a blueprint for its manufacture that includes 
the composition, shape, materials, dimensions, etc. But how exactly does form follow 
function? What is the type of reasoning involved? Where does the form come from? Is the 
form inferred directly from the function using some sort of rule set? Are there any 
intermediate steps in the reasoning that are more or less explicit? 
 
1.1 Some approaches to function-form reasoning 
Ullman (1992, p. 140) states that reasoning from function to form is done by a double 
mapping process: first from function to concept, and then from concept to form. His method 
for conceptual design then follows the German-school systematic design (Pahl & Beitz, 
1984), which prescribes a comprehensive functional decomposition stage, followed by finding 
working principles (concepts) for the various subfunctions and combining them into an 
overall concept (the principal solution) with the help of a morphological chart. The working 
principles usually consist of “physical effects + form”, while the principal solution is defined 
as an idealized representation of the structure that defines those characteristics that are 
essential for the functioning of the artifact (Roozenburg, 1993). Many variations on this 
approach appear in widely used design textbooks, including those by Otto & Wood (2000) 
and Ulrich & Eppinger (2007). Borrowing from AI and search techniques, this approach may 
be regarded as working “breadth-first” because the comprehensive functional decomposition 
stage has to be completed before moving on to the next level—the morphological chart—and 
this in turn has to be completed for all the subfunctions before initiating the stage of 
combining working principles into overall concepts. 
In contrast, other design paradigms emphasize the sequential and iterative character of 
applying the reasoning from function to form. Suh’s axiomatic design framework consists of 
the functional space and the physical space (Suh, 1990). The former contains functional 
requirements (FRs) and the latter, design parameters (DPs). Mapping FRs into DPs is the core 
of the design process; but because there can be many mapping techniques, the design axioms 
provide the principles to be satisfied by the mapping to produce good designs. Suh does not 
expand on how solution concepts or ideas are generated; rather, he uses many examples of 
design problems and their solution ideas to support the notions of FRs, DPs and the two 
axioms. The important point, however, is that the function to form mapping is applied 
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repeatedly: new functional requirements are constantly generated from previous design 
parameters, and so on. 
Another framework, function-behavior-structure or FBS (Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004), 
identifies several processes within design, such as transforming functional requirements into 
expected behaviors, transforming expected behaviors into solution structures, deriving actual 
behaviors from structures, comparing derived with expected behaviors, and responding to 
unsatisfactory behaviors by reformulating the design space (changing the structure, behavior 
or function). These design steps are again applied repeatedly, as with Suh’s model. Also 
common to the axiomatic design and FBS models is that they do not use the notion of 
‘concept’, in the sense of underlying solution ideas, as an explicit constituent of the reasoning 
process. This may be due to the fact that these models are descriptive—they tell how design is 
carried out in practice—so they emphasize what is apparent to an outside observer of 
designers: needs (functions) are turned into physical solutions, while the ideas (concepts) 
remain implicit, in the designer’s mind. 
 
1.2 The parameter analysis method of conceptual design 
Parameter analysis (PA), the conceptual design method discussed in this article, is different 
from the other method in that it makes the concepts the pivot about which the design process 
revolves. Contrary to systematic design, but similar to axiomatic design and FBS, PA presents 
the design process as a repeatedly applied sequence of steps, not a single pass through major 
stages. PA originally started as an empirically derived descriptive model, in which the 
designer moves back and forth between the space of ideas (concept space) and the space of 
physical realizations (configuration space) (Li et al, 1980). It was later developed onto a 
prescriptive model, facilitating the intra-space mental movement by three distinct steps (Kroll 
et al. 2001; Kroll, 2013): parameter identification (PI) corresponds to finding a “parameter” 
(concept, idea) for resolving a functional issue with the evolving design. This concept is 
mapped into form by the creative synthesis (CS) step, and the last configuration is tested by 
an evaluation (E) step. This last step often results in new functional issues (unsatisfactory or 
undesirable behavior) to be resolved, so the process continues until an acceptable solution has 
been reached. 
In previous work (Kroll & Koskela, 2015) we studied the method of PA from the 
perspective of the proto-theory of design, which is based on the method of geometric analysis, 
as suggested by Aristotle. It was concluded that certain design “moves” could be explained as 
being deductive, some as regressive, but others were more difficult to cast in this framework 
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and were characterized as being compositional or transformational/interpretational. As shown 
in Figure 1, deductive reasoning (the E step) is used to infer behavioral aspects from the 
evolving configuration, from which a functional aspect to be addressed next is derived. This 
function is the input to PI, where a concept, idea (“parameter”) is sought to satisfy it, and this 
is often done by transforming the problem or interpreting it in a different way. Once a concept 
has been identified, another regressive inference takes place to create a configuration, 
hardware representation, form that realizes the concept. The second CS step in Figure 1 
represents composition—the integration of the last configurational solution in the overall 
form of the design artifact. The main focus of the current paper is on the PI and first CS steps, 
as they stand for the core operations in design: reasoning from function to concept, and 
reasoning from concept to form, respectively. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
PA is unique in that it places the most emphasis on the PI step. The reasoning at the 
conceptual level is claimed to be so important, that “parameters”—ideas, concepts, operating 
principles, underlying physical effects, etc.—have to be stated explicitly. The E step is 
considered second in importance, because it involves abstracting from a particular problem to 
new functional issues at the conceptual level. The actual step of giving form to the design, 
CS, is ranked the least important, as intermediate configurations are needed mostly to 
facilitate the evaluation, and any unsatisfactory characteristic of a configuration will be 
mended in the next cycle. So, although the outcome of the design process is certainly a 
configuration, the philosophy of PA is that the reasons, justifications and derivations behind 
the configuration are indispensable when it comes to presenting a design solution or studying 
the process of designing.  
The following two examples of PA processes are reproduced below from (Kroll, 2011) and 
(Kroll et al., 2014), respectively. They represent design processes that are different in nature. 
The first is “linear” in the sense of pursuing a single fundamental concept and incrementally 
improving it, while in the second, various technologies are explored until a breakthrough 
takes place and a totally new concept emerges. 
 
Example 1: Designing a sensitive tiltmeter 
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A device was needed for measuring very small angles of tilt of the ground with respect to the 
local gravity vector. The inventor’s account of his thought process as PA follows, with Figure 
2 showing a schematic of the design: 
 
PI1: A simple pendulum can be used to measure tilt. 
CS1: A very long device, of the order of 50 m, will be required for the small angles that  
 need to be measured. 
E1: This is too long. A physically short pendulum (~0.5 m) that behaves as if it’s long is  
 needed. 
 
PI2: A simple pendulum being displaced laterally can be thought of as a spring, that is,  
 producing a restoring force proportional to the displacement. Stating that the  
 pendulum needs to be very long is equivalent to requiring a very soft spring (small  
 spring constant k). But how can a small k be obtained when the physical dimensions  
 should be kept small? Let’s use the difference between two large spring constants  
 (short pendulums) to yield a small k (effectively long pendulum). This requires a  
 negative spring, i.e., one that produces a force in the direction of the disturbance, and  
 this can be provided by unstable devices such as an inverted pendulum. 
CS2:  The configuration consists of two coupled pendulums, one simple and one inverted;  
 the resultant spring constant is made small but positive, thus producing the desired  
 high sensitivity while being stable. 
E2:  This may work, but friction in the joints needs to be reduced to ensure the required  
 sensitivity. 
 
PI3:  Minimize friction by using rolling contact instead of sliding. 
CS3:  Flexural hinges with near-zero resistance are implemented in the joints. 
E3:  Displacement measurement, also without friction, is needed. 
 
PI4:  Use a non-contact technology for displacement measurement 
CS4:  A capacitor-type sensor is added to the design. 
E4: … 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
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Example 2: Designing decelerators for airborne sensors 
The means of decelerating airborne sensors for monitoring air quality and composition was 
needed. The sensors were to be released at about 3,000 m from a container carried by a light 
aircraft, so compact packing was required, and stay in the air for at least 15 minutes. A partial 
description of the designers’ PA process follows: 
 
PI1:  Deceleration can be produced using a flexible parachute. 
CS1: A 150-mm dia. hemispherical parachute, connected to the sensor with cords. 
E1: Drag force is ok and compact packing can be done by folding, but the parachute may  
 not open because there isn’t enough “pull” on it, and the cords may tangle. 
 
PI2: A rigid parachute may be used to generate the drag force, eliminating the deployment  
 problem. 
CS2: A 150-mm diagonal square pyramid with the sensor rigidly attached. 
E2: Drag force is ok but compact packing is impossible because these configurations  
 cannot nest inside each other. 
 
PI3: Use a frame + flexible sheet construction that can fold like an umbrella, and use a  
 spring for opening. 
CS3: Lightweight skeleton made of plastic or composite with “Saran wrap” stretched and  
 glued onto it. Hinges and slides allow folding. A spring facilitates opening. 
E3: Drag force and compact packing are ok, but this structure is unreliable and expensive  
 to manufacture because of the many moving parts. 
 
PI4: Looking at the problem from an energy viewpoint instead of producing retarding  
 force, the sensor’s potential energy can be dissipated over a longer distance by a  
 smaller drag force. Use a small spiraling glider. 
CS4: Wings with a span of 200 mm and a small twist to produce a 30-m diameter  spiral  
 trajectory. The wings are made of Styrofoam and the sensor attached with plastic  
 clips, as shown in Figure 3. 
E4: … 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
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1.3 Summary 
PA is a practical method that has been taught and practiced for over two decades. The 
examples demonstrated the type of reasoning that takes place: PI represents reasoning from 
function (what should be done to satisfy a need or to improve an evolving design) to concept 
(“parameter” in PA terms, which is the idea, technology, physical principle, etc.) to be used to 
attain the functional goal. CS starts with the latest concept and seeks to realize it in form, what 
is called “configuration” in PA. In addition to these two regressive reasoning steps, E is 
clearly deductive, of the “given structure, find behavior” type. But how can we characterize 
the PI and CS steps better in terms of the entities and reasoning involved so as to improve our 
understanding of the function to form reasoning in design? To answer this question, we need 
to consult a logic-based framework. 
 
2. Design abduction 
Regressive and transformational inferences in design are of particular interest as they involve 
heuristic reasoning and intuition, notions that are sometimes associated with the type of 
inference called abduction. For example, abductive reasoning has been identified with the 
notions of intuition (Cross, 2006, p. 33), creativity and subconscious activities (Dew, 2007). 
Of course, abduction has for long been discussed in philosophy of science, where an ongoing 
debate exists regarding its exact nature. 
Peirce (1994) is attributed with proposing that abduction is a form of “synthetic” reasoning 
(together with induction, but different from the “analytic” reasoning of deduction), while 
focusing on scientific explanation. Researchers still disagree on the exact nature of induction 
(Vickers, 2013) and certainly on abduction. Schurz (2008) presents a thorough classification 
of abduction patterns, all of which are “special patterns of inference to the best explanation”. 
He identifies many types of abduction based on three dimensions. The main dimension is the 
type of hypothesis (conclusion) abduced. The other two are the type of evidence to be 
explained and the cognitive mechanism driving the abduction. Schurz refers to “the official 
Peirce abduction schema” as “factual abduction” of the following structure: 
 
Known Law: IF Cx THEN Ex 
(1)Known Evidence: Ea has occurred 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abduced Conjecture: Ca could be the reason 
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Investigations of abduction in relation to design have mostly been carried out by scholars 
in design theory and artificial intelligence. Both streams of research are briefly outlined in the 
following. In design theory, March (1976) seminally suggests that abduction, which he calls 
“productive reasoning”, is the key mode of reasoning in design. He also points to the 
confusion and misunderstanding created by not distinguishing between scientific and design 
hypotheses, and between logical propositions and design proposals. Whereas the goal of 
science is to establish general laws, he says, design is concerned with realizing a particular 
outcome. The pattern of abduction proposed by March is: from certain characteristics that are 
sought, and on the basis of previous knowledge and models of possibilities, a design proposal 
is put forward.  
Roozenburg (1993) discusses in depth the question whether the reasoning towards a 
tentative description of a design follows the conventional view on abduction, or whether it 
should be defined differently. He argues that the commonly presented view, especially in 
artificial intelligence literature, deals with “explanatory abductions”, which are good for 
diagnosis or troubleshooting, but that the core of design reasoning follows another type of 
abduction, for which he proposes the terms “innovative abduction” and “innoduction” 
(Roozenburg, 1995). In fact, says Roozenburg (1993), Habermas distinguished between 
explanatory abduction as in (1) and innovative abduction, in which the law is not known and 
needs to be inferred together with the presumed reason for the evidence, and it was March 
who did not make that distinction. 
A more recent paper by Dorst (2011) proposes yet another view on design abduction. It 
claims that there are two types of abduction relevant to design: abduction-1 which follows a 
similar pattern to (1), and abduction-2 which is comparable to Roozenburg’s innoduction. 
Furthermore, Dorst suggests chaining these two inferences into a single reasoning step, which 
is the core of ‘design thinking’. In spite of Roozenburg’s introduction of the concept of 
innovative abduction and Dorst’s adoption of it, some design scholars still maintain Peirce’s 
view and try to apply his “process of scientific inquiry”, consisting of cycles of abduction, 
deduction, and induction, to the area of design (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2013). 
In artificial intelligence oriented research on design abduction, the emphasis has been on 
computable abduction models. To some extent this work is overlapping with and influenced 
by design theory research on abduction. For example, Goel (1998) proposes to extend (and 
complicate) March’s model if we wish to use it in knowledge-based systems. His argument is 
based on the fact that the laws (also called rules or knowledge) can have different logical 
natures; for example, universal or statistical, and this affects the meaning of the abduction 
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pattern. However, the influential work led by Takeda et al. (1990) on design abduction is 
based on original insights into design, and the connection to Peirce’s seminal work on 
abduction in science seems looser. Abduction is defined as a process making integrated 
hypotheses and theories to explain given facts (Takeda, 1994), a definition that goes beyond 
Schurz’ classification of abduction (Tomiyama et al., 2003). Analogical reasoning is applied 
for computationally supporting abduction (Takeda et al., 2003). 
To conclude, it seems that abduction has the potential to explain design moves in which 
new solutions are created, in general, and the PI and CS steps of PA in particular. For that 
purpose, we shall now examine both Roozenburg’s and Dorst’s models. 
 
3. Roozenburg’s model of a single innovative abduction 
3.1 The syllogistic form 
Science’s explanatory abduction, also called “presumption of fact”, is actually a reversal of 
deduction, says Roozenburg (1993). In deduction we have the following logical expression: 
 
p  q (a given rule, IF p THEN q) 
(2)p (p is a given fact, a case or cause) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
q (q is the conclusion, the result) 
 
and reversing it gives: 
 
p  q (a given rule, IF p THEN q) 
(3)q (q is a given fact, a result) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p (p is the conclusion, the case or cause) 
 
Expression (3) is the definition of explanatory abduction, similar to (1), where the 
conclusion is a plausible cause. According to Roozenburg, pattern (3) is not the main 
reasoning form in design, where the only given is a desired result, and both the rule and the 
cause need to be discovered. His innovative abduction therefore follows the pattern: 
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q (q is a given fact, a desired result) 
(4)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q (a rule to be inferred first, IF p THEN q) 
p (p is the conclusion, the cause, that immediately follows) 
 
Pattern (4) is the real abduction in design because it represents reasoning from a function, a 
desired result or purpose, to form and use. Form and use are the ‘principal solution’, the 
structure of the artifact and its way of use that define its function. 
 
3.2 Demonstration: designing a kettle 
Roozenburg demonstrates innovative abduction through the example of designing the first 
ever kettle. The purpose, function, is to boil water. The mode of action (defined as ‘using laws 
of nature to produce a desired effect’), or functional behavior, is heating the bottom of the 
kettle and conducting the heat to the water inside. This will be facilitated by the way of use 
(also called ‘actuation’) of filling the kettle with water and placing it on a burner. Finally, to 
allow all this, the kettle must have a specific form: hemisphere with opening at the top and 
metal construction. 
Now that there are four distinct entities involved in the reasoning (function, mode of action, 
way of use, and form), Roozenburg groups together form and way of use into one entity, 
claiming that they always go hand in hand, so he writes: 
 
form + way of use  mode of action  function (5) 
 
or in other words: hemisphere and metal + fill with water and place on burner  heat bottom 
of kettle and conduct heat to the water inside  boil water. 
Next, the intermediate result (mode of action) in expression (5) can be omitted, so what is 
left is: 
 
form + way of use  function (6) 
 
or: hemisphere and metal + fill with water and place on burner  boil water. 
The function (boil water) is given in design, says Roozenburg. What needs to be designed 
is usually considered to be the form (hemisphere and metal). But a description of form is not 
enough to predict the behavior which fulfills the function. The behavior (mode of action) 
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depends on form but also on the way of use. So, the designer needs to develop ideas on way of 
use together with form. It follows that the “kernel of design” is the reasoning from function to 
form + way of use. This, according to Roozenburg, follows the same pattern of reasoning as 
Habermas’ innovative abduction, expression (4), if we define p as the combined description of 
form + way of use: 
 
q boil water (the only given is the function) 
(7)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on burner THEN boil 
water (IF form + way of use THEN function; the rule to be inferred first) 
p hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on burner (form + way of 
use; the second conclusion) 
 
The meaning of the last logical inference is that if you want to boil water, you need to 
‘discover’ the first conclusion (hemisphere and metal form + filling water and placing on 
burner way of use  boil water function), and immediately you will get the second conclusion 
(hemisphere and metal form + filling water and placing on burner way of use). The second 
conclusion constitutes the principal solution to the design problem. 
 
3.3 Is a single abduction enough? 
The question regarding Roozenburg’s claim is whether the designer who wants to boil water 
can generate the ‘rule’ in the first conclusion directly, without reasoning about the mode of 
action (heating the bottom of the kettle and conducting the heat to the water inside) first. 
Roozenburg’s description does not include the mode of action explicitly, assuming perhaps 
that somehow the designer has gained the insight on using this specific mode of action, which 
is the main characteristic of the principal solution, and now proceeds according to pattern (7). 
Roozenburg’s presentation of abduction can be modified to expression (8), where the 
underlined addition of the mode of action, the operating principle, makes it explicit: 
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q boil water by heating the bottom of a container and conducting the heat 
to the water (function and mode of action) 
(8)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on burner THEN boil 
water by heating the bottom of a container and conducting the heat to 
the water (the first conclusion) 
p hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on burner (the second 
conclusion) 
 
But this raises two new questions: (a) where did the mode of action come from in the first 
place, and should it not be an explicit abductive step by itself in the description of the “kernel 
of design”? and (b) does pattern (8) represent what really happens during design? 
 
3.4 From single to double abductions 
To answer these questions, let us try to imagine the thought process while designing (the first 
ever) kettle. We need to design a device to boil water (but in a certain context, of having at 
our disposal a burner, and the boiled water will be used to make tea, as opposed for example 
to generating steam in a sauna). What operating principle can we use? Here is an idea: we 
need some sort of container that can be filled with water and placed over the burner. Then the 
bottom of the container will be heated, and the heat will be conducted to the water inside 
(note that we came up with a mode of action – heating the bottom of the water container and 
conducting the heat to the water, and way of use – filling the container with water and placing 
it on the burner). Now that we have decided on these (mode of action + way of use), we ask 
ourselves what form we should give the device to work properly (that is, a form that when 
used as intended – filled with water and placed on burner – will result in the intended mode of 
action, conducting the heat to the water). The answer now is, use a hemisphere with opening 
at the top and make it out of metal. 
The reasoning above is clearly from function to mode of action + way of use first, followed 
by reasoning from mode of action + way of use to form. Roozenburg represents this process 
as a single innovative abduction, wherein the mode of action is implicit, so it gives the 
impression that the main idea (mode of action) is not part of the abduction at all. Moreover, 
Roozenburg combines way of use with form into a single entity, as if they are inseparable. 
A more correct way to represent the above reasoning process may be by a two-step or 
double innovative abduction to capture the fact that two distinct inferences are carried out: 
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1st step: 
q boil water (the function) 
(9)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF fill water and place on burner so heat is conducted to water THEN 
boil water (the first conclusion: way of use + mode of action  
function) 
p fill water and place on burner so heat is conducted to water (the second 
conclusion: way of use + mode of action) 
 
2nd step: 
q fill water and place on burner so heat is conducted to water (the newly 
generated way of use + mode of action is now the given) 
(10)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF hemisphere with opening and metal THEN fill water and place on 
burner so heat is conducted to water (the first conclusion: form  way 
of use + mode of action) 
p hemisphere with opening and metal (the second conclusion: form) 
 
To summarize, the above two-step reasoning allows inferring from function to an idea, 
concept or solution principle (showing as way of use + mode of action) first, and from that 
principle, to the form. In general we can say that each innovative abduction reasoning step of 
pattern (4) involves two entities, p and q, but design reasoning should involve four entities: 
function, mode of action, way of use, and form. And although we claim that mode of action 
and way of use seem to frequently show together, so they can be counted as one entity, the 
three remaining entities still require two inferences, not one. What Roozenburg did is actually 
leaving out mode of action and grouping form and way of use into one entity, claiming that 
together they are the sought solution, so he could reduce the problem to a two-entity single 
abduction. 
Support for the insight that four entities should be involved in describing design reasoning 
can be found in the work of Zeng and Cheng [19], which Roozenburg claims arrived at 
similar conclusions to his. Zeng and Cheng argue that design reasoning involves three 
entities: form, function and environment, and that the environment consists of two entities: 
laws of nature and actions of nature. If laws of nature are Roozenburg’s mode of action, and 
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actions of nature are his way of use, then we have a one-to-one correspondence of the four 
entities. 
 
4. Dorst’s model of double abduction 
4.1 The syllogistic form 
Dorst (2011) also must have realized that a single abduction cannot explain ‘design thinking’. 
His presentation of abduction revolves around the following logical expression: 
 
what (the artifact) + how (the working principle)  value (aspired) (11) 
 
in which the (aspired) value is always given. If the how is also given, the designer generates 
the what by a so-called abduction-1, which is precisely the explanatory abduction of pattern 
(3). Dorst calls this case “conventional (‘closed’) problem-solving that designers often do”. If, 
however, the how is not given, then this is a more ‘open’ problem for which the designer 
needs to decide on both the working principle and the artifact. This is accomplished by 
abduction-2, as in pattern (4), which is the same as Roozenburg’s innovative abduction. 
Abduction-2 is carried out by first developing or adopting a ‘frame’ (after Schön), which is a 
“general implication that by applying a certain working principle we will create a specific 
value”. With the help of framing, abduction-2 takes place according to the following pattern: 
 
q (q is the given desired value) 
(12)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q (IF how THEN value, the first conclusion) 
p (how, the second conclusion) 
 
When a possible or promising frame has been proposed and the how is known, says Dorst, 
abduction-1 can take place to design the what, the artifact. 
 
4.2 What type of second abduction? 
Let us now apply Dorst’s double-step reasoning process (abduction-2 followed by abduction-
1) to Roozenburg’s kettle example. Surely, the value in expressions (11) and (12) corresponds 
to function, and the what in (11) corresponds to form (Dorst calls it the ‘object’ or ‘thing’). 
The how, therefore, must stand for the way of use + mode of action (also to be in agreement 
with Zeng and Cheng on having four entities involved in design reasoning). If we set value = 
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“boil water” as the only known fact, abduction-2 may yield a possible working principle, a 
how, which is the following way of use + mode of action: “fill water and place on burner so 
heat is conducted to water”. So far this is identical to expression (9). 
Now we need to design the what, or form, and Dorst suggests that this will be done by 
abduction-1 because we know the value and how in expression (11). For abduction-1 to take 
place according to pattern (3), however, the conclusion should appear as the premise of the 
given rule, and this does not seem to be the case here. The what is still unknown (recall that 
this is the first kettle ever), and of course this is why this kind of explanatory abduction 
cannot be the main form of reasoning in design. The only possibility is to use abduction-2 
again, starting with the only known, the how found in the previous step, and using it as the 
given to seek a “rule” to tie together a what (form) to this how (working principle), and 
therefore inferring that what. The resulting inference is identical to expression (10). 
 
5. The double innovative abduction in parameter analysis 
Having modified Roozenburg’s and Dorst’s models of reasoning from function to form to two 
innovative abduction (or abduction-2) inferences, as in (9) and (10), allows us to compare this 
model with PA. As explained and demonstrated earlier, PI is reasoning from a functional 
aspect to a solution principle, which is equivalent to the first innovative abduction as in (9). 
The solution principle (concept) consists of way of use + mode of action. The second step is 
CS, where the reasoning begins with the solution principle derived in PI and ends with a 
configuration, structure, or form, as in (10). Overall we obtain the double mapping function 
 concept  form.  
The examples of PA described in Section 1.2 can easily be presented as such double 
abductions. The cycles of double innovative abductions—corresponding to the PI and CS 
steps with the deductive E step occurring after each cycle—as applicable to Example 1 is 
shown by expressions (13) to (20): 
 
PI1: 
q measure tilt (the function; specified by the need definition) 
(13)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF a simple pendulum is used THEN tilt can be measured (the first 
conclusion: way of use + mode of action  function) 
p a simple pendulum (the second conclusion: way of use + mode of 
action) 
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CS1: 
q a simple pendulum (the newly generated way of use + mode of action is 
now the given) 
(14)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF the pendulum is 50 m long THEN the required resolution will be 
obtained (the first conclusion: form  way of use + mode of action) 
p a 50-m long pendulum (the second conclusion: form) 
 
At this point E1 concludes that the pendulum is too long, and a short pendulum that 
behaves as if it were long is needed. This becomes the given function to be realized in the 
next cycle: 
 
PI2: 
q a short pendulum that behaves as if it were long 
(15)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF a long pendulum is like a soft spring THEN the difference between 
two large spring constants will give a long-pendulum behavior 
p small difference between two large spring constants 
 
CS2: 
q small difference between two large spring constants 
(16)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF two short pendulums, one simple and one inverted, are coupled 
THEN a small difference between their spring constants will be obtained 
p two short pendulums, simple and inverted, coupled by a hinged crossbar 
 
E2 now deduces that for the device to work properly, joint friction needs to be reduced: 
 
PI3: 
q reduce joint friction 
(17)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF rolling contact replaces sliding THEN friction is reduced 
p rolling contact instead of sliding 
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CS3: 
q rolling contact instead of sliding 
(18)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF flexures are used THEN rolling contact replaces sliding 
p flexures 
 
E3 now comes up with a new problem, of measuring the displacement without friction, so the 
process continues: 
 
PI4: 
q displacement measurement without friction 
(19)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF a non-contact measurement technique is used THEN no friction will 
be present 
p non-contact measurement technique 
 
CS4: 
q non-contact measurement technique 
(20)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q IF capacitor-type sensor is used THEN a non-contact technique is 
implemented 
p capacitor-type sensor 
 
Similarly, Example 2 can be presented as the following sequence of pairs of innovative 
abductions with deductive evaluations between each pair: The first given function, 
decelerating airborne sensors, led to abducing the concept of flexible parachutes (PI1), which 
in turn produced a specific form (CS1) by a second abduction. Evaluation showed a potential 
deployment problem, so its elimination became the next function. The designer now abduced 
the concept of rigid parachutes (PI2) and a particular form of such structure (CS2), but 
discovered the problem with compact packing. The next cycle of double innovative 
abductions (PI3 and CS3) shows the inference of an “umbrella” concept and the corresponding 
configuration, followed by deducing that the latest structure was unreliable and expensive. 
The last PA cycle, comprising PI4 and CS4, is a breakthrough in the design process because a 
totally new concept (spiraling glider) emerged and was realized as a specific hardware 
description. 
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6. Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the different terms used by the four models of this paper for clarification 
of their starting point, intermediate entities, and end point. There are four fundamental units 
involved in the reasoning, for which we may adopt the terms function, way of use, mode of 
action, and form. Some models use other names for these entities, but a bigger difference is in 
how they are sometimes grouped together, made implicit, or serve a different role. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
We propose that reasoning from function to form may be productively modelled in terms of 
two creative leaps, each requiring an abduction-2/innovative abduction reasoning step. The 
first infers the solution principle to be used to attain the desired function, and the second 
infers the artifact that can utilize the solution principle. The pattern of abductions involved is 
very different from explanatory abduction, so having a special name for this kind of reasoning 
seems justified. 
Solution principle or concept is comprised of way of use + mode of action. The mode of 
action is much more fundamental to the reasoning than the way of use. In fact, way of use may 
be trivial in many cases, so it may not appear in the description of the inferences. For 
instance, PI1 in Example 1 only specifies “a simple pendulum” as the concept (way of use + 
mode of action). But this is understandable when it comes to designers’ reasoning: a simple 
pendulum implies hanging a weight on a string or rod that are hinged onto some frame (way 
of use) and the mode of action is the self-alignment of the pendulum with the gravitational 
field while the frame is being tilted with the ground, so an angle identical to the ground’s 
inclination is formed between the frame and pendulum. Similarly, decelerating the sensor by a 
parachute (PI1 in Example 2) is the obvious way of use + mode of action in the overall setting 
of the design task: it unequivocally means that if the sensor is attached to the parachute with 
cords and both are released in midair (way of use), then drag force due to air resistance will be 
generated to slow down the “fall” (mode of action). The way of use of filling water and 
putting the water-filled kettle over a burner is also trivial, because the initial problem 
statement should have involved a burner as the source of thermal energy (and not, for 
instance, electricity) and the purpose of boiling the water (for making tea we may want to 
contain the boiled water, as opposed to producing steam in a sauna). 
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In contrast to the sometimes hidden presence of the way of use, the importance of explicitly 
including the mode of action in the inference cannot be overstated. When the designer thinks 
in conceptual terms about physical and working principles, the designed artifact will be based 
on a solid ideational foundation. Alternative working principles may be thought of, the 
rationale of the design will be captured better for possible use in the future, and deeper 
understanding of the problem domain will be gained by the designer. For instance, the 
understanding of pendulum physics is what brought about the analogy between a pendulum 
and a spring (both generate a restoring force proportional and opposite to the displacement 
(PI2 in Example 1). Understanding the physics of work (force times distance) is what led to 
the breakthrough in the decelerators’ design, when realizing that vertical descent presumes a 
distance equal to the release altitude, but this could be modified to spiraling descent. 
Similarly, the choice of metal construction in the form of the kettle may be modified when 
explicating the mode of action—heating the bottom and conducting the heat to the water 
inside—perhaps by looking for materials with high thermal diffusivity or combining a heat 
conducting material for the bottom and a heat insulating material for the sides of the kettle. 
Dorst (2011) specifically refers to this issue. When describing the pattern of abduction-2 as 
in (11) he says: “students and other novice designers can be seen to almost randomly generate 
proposals for both the ‘how’ and the ‘what’, and then seek to find a matching pair that does 
lead to the aspired value”. In our experience, the issue is not the random trial-and-error 
process, but rather an attempt to reason from function (aspired value) directly to form (the 
what), without the intermediate step of reasoning about the concept (the how).  
Having proposed a double innovative abduction/abduction-2 model, we may ask whether 
explanatory abduction/abduction-1 exists in design at all. While March and some other 
researchers seem to refer to only this type of abduction in the context of design, we have 
shown that both generating a concept (working principle) and an artifact (form) require 
abductive reasoning with only one fact, the desired value, as a given. In both cases a rule 
needs to be inferred first, and the premise of the rule immediately follows. The two inferences 
do not share the same desired value: when generating a working principle, the value is the 
function; when generating the form, the value is the working principle of the previous step. 
However, we can imagine situations where the working principle is taken as a given, resulting 
in abduction of pattern (3) occurring. These seem to be cases in which the problem situation is 
so familiar to the designer that the working principle is taken for granted and becomes 
implicit in the reasoning. For example, a structural engineer who regularly designs apartment 
buildings may specify an I-section (form) for the ceiling-support beam (implied function of 
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carrying bending loads) directly, without consciously thinking of the working principle of 
increasing the section’s second moment of area by placing most of the material away from the 
neutral axis.  
But the above argument does not necessarily imply that innoduction/abduction-2 occur 
only in innovative design situations. Pattern (4) of reasoning, in which the ‘rule’ part (be it 
concept  function or form  concept) is not considered a given, can in fact take place in 
two very different circumstances. First, in the more routine design situations, many applicable 
‘rules’ may exist in the designer’s repertoire, and the abductive step is required to select 
among them. For example, this may apply to the ceiling-support beam case, when the design 
requirements are slightly changed and the designer recalls form  concept rules concerning 
also C-sections and rectangular-tube sections. Magnani (1995) has called this kind of 
inference, where one selects from a set of known rules, selective abduction. Second, in what 
may be termed “innovative design” situations, the ‘rule’ simply does not exist (either in the 
particular designer’s mind, or universally) and needs to be ‘discovered’. For example, if the 
ceiling-support beam is required to also provide an easy or aesthetic connection to glass walls, 
the designer may invent a new section shape that is different from ‘standard’ or existing 
shapes. Inference of a new concept  function rule seems even more innovative, as it implies 
discovering a new working principle to satisfy a function. Consider for example the first time 
houses were built out of shipping containers, or the still-futuristic concept of getting to space 
with an elevator. 
Clearly, the present work is not intended to be the definitive and complete treatment of 
abduction in design. Just as understanding of abduction in philosophy and other areas still 
evolves, researchers in design have to develop further understanding of this fundamental 
notion. In doing so, problems originating both from understanding of abduction in science, 
and from the adoption of abduction in design have to be overcome. In general, while 
especially March’ and Roozenburg’s treatments of abduction can be considered seminal and 
have stimulated further research, they leave room for several critical remarks. These are not 
meant to downplay the value of the early treatments but rather emphasize the generative value 
of them. 
The central motivation for defining abduction, from Aristotle to Peirce, has been to cover 
for logical inferences that cannot be classified as either inductions or deductions. However, 
this demarcation is made challenging by the situation that still it is not at all clear what 
induction is, as stated by Vickers (2013): “attempting to define induction would be more 
difficult than rewarding”. Further, Vickers contends that there is no comprehensive theory of 
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sound induction, no set of agreed upon rules that license good or sound inductive inference, 
nor is there a serious prospect of such a theory. That induction is not a settled concept makes 
it indeed difficult to gauge what is outside induction and deduction. 
However, there is more to abduction than revealed in logical analysis. Already from Peirce 
onwards, abduction has been connected to intuition and creativity. There has been much 
research on these two phenomena as such, but there seems to have been very little scholarly 
attention specifically on the creative and/or intuitive aspects of abduction. These connections 
need to be cultivated and expanded for added understanding. Indeed one question is whether 
we need to set criteria regarding or at least acknowledge its intuitive and creative character 
when defining abduction. In recent literature, Hoffman (1999) seems to have moved into this 
direction. In this context, two further questions arise: Is all creativity in science or design 
channeled through abductive inferences? Is creative abduction always based on intuition? 
With its origin in the scientific method, the main type of abduction has generally been 
identified as backwards (regressive) reasoning, essentially through guessing, from 
consequences to hypothetical causes (in opposition to induction and deduction). In design, 
regressive and deductive inferences along means-ends hierarchies are prominent forms of 
reasoning. However, there are also other mental moves, such as decomposition and 
composition, as well as transformation (Koskela et al., 2014). Can we recognize cases in these 
other design moves that are in essential respects similar to abduction, that is, creatively 
pinpoint a solution candidate or at least the direction to it? This important question is closely 
related to the call for classification of different types of design abduction, to be presented 
below. 
In discussions on abduction in philosophy of science, there is a fixation to the syllogistic 
form of abduction, although already Peirce (1994) downplayed syllogism as “the lowest and 
most rudimentary of all forms of reasoning”. Schurz (2008) cogently argues that there exist 
rather different kinds of abduction patterns; while some of them enjoy a broad discussion in 
the literature, other important patterns have been neglected. This fixation to the syllogistic 
form of abduction has been inherited to treatments of design abduction. The far more common 
way of conceptualizing design as moves along means-ends hierarchies (Hughes, 2009) is 
rarely analyzed from the perspective of abduction. To the same effect, Niiniluoto (1999) 
discusses the foundational role geometrical analysis has played as a model of reasoning in 
science, covering also abductive inferences in that analysis. However, the philosophical 
discussions on abduction rarely acknowledge this. The same complaint can be presented 
regarding the literature on design abduction. 
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The generic juxtaposition of the terms explanatory abduction and innovative abduction, as 
suggested by Roozenburg (under influence from Habermas), is not the best possible, as in 
science all abductions target explanation. The terms selective abduction and creative 
abduction, suggested by Magnani (1995), are better in this respect, although as Magnani 
himself concedes through his examples, the borderline between these is fluid. 
Although schematic examples are often good for purposes of presentation and 
demonstration, the advancement of scientific understanding on abduction requires the 
examination of abduction-like inferences in design as they occur in practice. Perhaps, in this 
way, a thorough classification, as done by Schurz (2008) for scientific abductions, could be 
carried out for design abductions. Interestingly, already the work of Takeda et al. (2003) has 
challenged the completeness of Schurz’ classification from a design viewpoint. The attempt of 
Ullah et al. (2012) to connect the notion of “classical abduction” as in (3) to the C–K Theory 
of design is another example of research endeavoring to interpret abduction from a design 
viewpoint. They conclude that conceiving a creative (“undecided” relative to existing 
knowledge) concept is more complex than abduction, being a motivation-driven process. 
Motivation here consists of a “compelling reason”—why a certain concept is pursued, and an 
“epistemic challenge”—seeking new knowledge.  
 
Conclusion 
It has been proposed here to modify the general model of design reasoning from function to 
form to the following two-step inference of the innovative abduction type that explicitly 
includes the concept, solution principle, in it: 
 
1st step: 
q given: function 
(21)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q first conclusion: IF concept THEN function 
p second conclusion: concept 
 
2nd step: 
q given: concept 
(22)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
p  q first conclusion: IF form THEN concept 
p second conclusion: form 
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This double innovative abduction model can enhance our understanding of design reasoning 
and contribute to design education and developing computational models in design. Dong et 
al. (2015), for example, seem to have adopted it to analyze the concept selection stage in 
design. Additionally, we showed how the parameter identification and creative synthesis 
reasoning steps in the PA conceptual design method correspond to the above two steps.  
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Table 1. Terminology used by the different models. 
 
Model Starting point Intermediate entities Final outcome 
Roozenburg function (also 
purpose, desired 
result) 
mode of action (also using laws of 
nature, functional behavior) 
principal 
solution = 
form (also 
structure) + way 
of use (also 
actuation) 
Zeng & Cheng function environment = laws of nature + 
actions of nature 
form 
Dorst (aspired) value how (also working principle) what (also 
artifact) 
Parameter 
Analysis (this 
paper) 
function (also 
need) 
“parameter” (concept, solution 
principle, way of use + mode of 
action) 
configuration 
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Figure 1. The parameter analysis process consists of repeatedly moving between concept 
space and configuration space by applying parameter identification (PI), creative synthesis 
(CS) and evaluation (E). Adapted from (Kroll & Koskela, 2015). 
  
29 
 
 
Figure 2. A schematic of the tiltmeter with input angle  producing a response  where  >> 
. The large circles are weights, small solid circles are flexural hinges, the lines represent stiff 
rods, and C is a differential capacitor transducer. Adapted from (Li, 1976). 
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Figure 3. A schematic of a small glider whose fuselage is the sensor to be decelerated. 
 
 
